This second essay (the first essay was ‘The End of Australia’s Financial Cycle’) reviews money creation, the central banks, the RBA, the commercial banks, and the end of the low-for-long interest rate era (2009–2021). The spillovers resulting from interest rate risk, the first stage of risk from the higher interest rate regime, have now baked into financial markets and have so far been well managed by central banks. The second risk stage, the credit loss stage, is still to materialise. The main takeaway from this essay is that overly accommodative central bank policies during the low-for-long era (2009–2021) ‘brought forward’ future asset price gains. This was mostly a policy response from central banks to ward off looming ‘bad’ deflation. Yet, the type of deflation experienced by most advanced economies was mostly misdiagnosed by central banks in the leadup period to the recent return of inflation. Central banks, which were mandated to hit near-term inflation targets, overstimulated their economies through their monetary responses that were designed to ensure inflation never settled below zero, which would induce in the public the perception of permanent deflation. The lowering of interest rates and the innovation of quantitative easing (QE) were overly relied upon by these central banks to put downward pressure on domestic exchange rates, increase household consumption, and increase asset values, such as housing prices, fostering ever more loan growth at the commercial banks. Yet, such policies are now in the process of being unwound; the associated monetary ‘lags’ are yet to play out for property markets. What has been underestimated is the role of money creation itself in the modern economy and how this has skewed asset pricing and sown the seeds of significant wealth inequalities.